Trump's Legacy

Supreme Court on Learning Resources v. Trump: Liberation Day Tariffs

Source: supremecourt.gov
Type: court-document
Archive Link: Wayback Machine
Published: 2026-02-20

Source Text

Excerpt only. The full text is too long to reproduce here:

Opinion of the Court
I
A
Shortly after taking office, President Trump sought to address two foreign threats. The first was the influx of illegal drugs from Canada, Mexico, and China. Presidential Proclamation No. 10886, 90 Fed. Reg. 8327 (2025); Exec. Order No. 14193, 90 Fed. Reg. 9113 (2025); Exec. Order No. 14194, 90 Fed. Reg. 9117 (2025); Exec. Order No. 14195, 90 Fed. Reg. 9121 (2025). The second was “large and persistent” trade deficits. Exec. Order No. 14257, 90 Fed. Reg. 15041 (2025). The President determined that the first threat had “created a public health crisis,” 90 Fed. Reg. 9113, and that the second had “led to the hollowing out” of the American manufacturing base and “undermined critical supply chains,” id., at 15041. He invoked his authority under IEEPA to respond.

Enacted in 1977, IEEPA gives the President economic tools to address significant foreign threats. 91 Stat. 1626. When acting under IEEPA, the President must identify an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to American national security, foreign policy, or the economy, originating primarily “outside the United States.” 50 U. S. C. §1701(a). And he must “declare[ ] a national emergency” under the National Emergencies Act. Ibid.; see 90 Stat. 1255. He may then, “by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise,” take the following actions to “deal with” the threat: “investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest.” §§1701(a), 1702(a)(1)(B).

President Trump declared a national emergency as to both the drug trafficking and the trade deficits, which he deemed “unusual and extraordinary” threats. He then imposed tariffs to deal with each threat. As to the drug trafficking tariffs, the President imposed a 25% duty on most Canadian and Mexican imports and a 10% duty on most Chinese imports. 90 Fed. Reg. 9114, 9118, 9122–9123. As to the trade deficit (or “reciprocal”) tariffs, the President imposed a duty “on all imports from all trading partners” of at least 10%. Id., at 15045. Dozens of nations faced higher rates. Id., at 15049. And these tariffs applied notwithstanding any extant trade agreements. Id., at 15045.

Since imposing each set of tariffs, the President has issued several increases, reductions, and other modifications. One month after imposing the 10% drug trafficking tariffs on Chinese goods, he increased the rate to 20%. See Exec. Order No. 14228, 90 Fed. Reg. 11463 (2025). One month later, he removed a statutory exemption for Chinese goods under $800. Exec. Order No. 14256, 90 Fed. Reg. 14899 (2025). Less than a week after imposing the reciprocal tariffs, the President increased the rate on Chinese goods from 34% to 84%. Exec. Order No. 14259, 90 Fed. Reg. 15509 (2025). The very next day, he increased the rate further still, to 125%. Exec. Order No. 14266, 90 Fed. Reg. 15625, 15626 (2025). This brought the total effective tariff rate on most Chinese goods to 145%. The President has also shifted sets of goods into and out of the reciprocal tariff framework. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 14360, 90 Fed. Reg. 54091 (2025) (exempting from reciprocal tariffs beef, fruits, coffee, tea, spices, and some fertilizers); Exec. Order No. 14346, 90 Fed. Reg. 43737 (2025). And he has issued a variety of other adjustments. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 14358, 90 Fed. Reg. 50729, 50730 (2025) (extending “the suspension of heightened reciprocal tariffs” on Chinese imports).

B
Petitioners in Learning Resources and respondents in V.O.S. Selections filed suit, alleging that IEEPA does not authorize the reciprocal or drug trafficking tariffs. The Learning Resources plaintiffs—two small businesses—sued in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The V.O.S. Selections plaintiffs—five small businesses and 12 States—sued in the United States Court of International Trade (CIT).

The Government moved to transfer the Learning Resources case to the CIT. It argued that the District Court lacked jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §1581(i)(1), which gives the CIT “exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced against” the Government “that arises out of any law of the United States providing for … tariffs” or their “administration and enforcement.” The District Court denied that motion and granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that IEEPA did not grant the President the power to impose tariffs. 784 F. Supp. 3d 209 (DC 2025).

In the V.O.S. Selections case, the CIT granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. 772 F. Supp. 3d 1350 (2025). The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed in relevant part. 149 F. 4th 1312 (2025). It first concluded that the CIT had exclusive jurisdiction because the plaintiffs’ claims arose out of modifications to the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS). Id., at 1329. On the merits, it agreed with the CIT that IEEPA’s grant of authority to “regulate … importation” did not authorize the challenged tariffs, which “are unbounded in scope, amount, and duration.” Id., at 1338. Judge Cunningham concurred (for four judges), reasoning that IEEPA did not authorize the President to impose any tariffs. Id., at 1340. Judge Taranto dissented (for four judges), concluding that IEEPA authorized the challenged tariffs. Id., at 1348.

The Government filed a motion to expedite and a petition for certiorari in V.O.S. Selections, and the Learning Resources plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari before judgment. We granted the motion and petitions and consolidated the cases. 606 U. S. 1050 (2025).

II
Based on two words separated by 16 others in Section 1702(a)(1)(B) of IEEPA—“regulate” and “importation”—the President asserts the independent power to impose tariffs on imports from any country, of any product, at any rate, for any amount of time. Those words cannot bear such weight.

A
1
Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution sets forth the powers of the Legislative Branch. The first Clause of that provision specifies that “The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.” It is no accident that this power appears first. The power to tax was, Alexander Hamilton explained, “the most important of the authorities proposed to be conferred upon the Union.” The Federalist No. 33, pp. 202–203 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). It is both a “power to destroy,” McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 431 (1819), and a power “necessary to the existence and prosperity of a nation”—“the one great power upon which the whole national fabric is based.” Nicol v. Ames, 173 U. S. 509, 515 (1899).

The power to impose tariffs is “very clear[ly] … a branch of the taxing power.” Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 201 (1824). “A tariff,” after all, “is a tax levied on imported goods and services.” Congressional Research Service (CRS), C. Casey, U. S. Tariff Policy: Overview 1 (2025). And tariffs “raise[ ] revenue,” West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U. S. 186, 193 (1994)—the defining feature of a tax, United States v. Kahriger, 345 U. S. 22, 28, and n. 4 (1953); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U. S. 506, 514 (1937). Indeed, the Framers expected that the Government would for “a long time depend … chiefly on” tariffs for revenue. The Federalist No. 12, at 93 (A. Hamilton). Little wonder, then, that the First Congress’s first exercise of its taxing power (and its second enacted law, right after the one providing for the new officials to take an oath) was a tariff law. See Act of July 4, 1789, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 24.

Recognizing the taxing power’s unique importance, and having just fought a revolution motivated in large part by “taxation without representation,” the Framers gave Congress “alone … access to the pockets of the people.” The Federalist No. 48, at 310 (J. Madison); see also Declaration of Independence ¶19. They required “All Bills for raising Revenue [to] originate in the House of Representatives.” U. S. Const., Art. I, §7, cl. 1. And in doing so, they ensured that only the House could “propose the supplies requisite for the support of government,” thereby reducing “all the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches.” The Federalist No. 58, at 359 (J. Madison). They did not vest any part of the taxing power in the Executive Branch. See Nicol, 173 U. S., at 515 (“[T]he whole power of taxation rests with Congress”).

The Government thus concedes, as it must, that the President enjoys no inherent authority to impose tariffs during peacetime. Tr. of Oral Arg. 70–71. And it does not defend the challenged tariffs as an exercise of the President’s warmaking powers. The United States, after all, is not at war with every nation in the world. The Government instead relies exclusively on IEEPA. It reads the words “regulate” and “importation” to effect a sweeping delegation of Congress’s power to set tariff policy—authorizing the President to impose tariffs of unlimited amount and duration, on any product from any country. 50 U. S. C. §1702(a)(1)(B).

2
We have long expressed “reluctan[ce] to read into ambiguous statutory text” extraordinary delegations of Congress’s powers. West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 723 (2022) (quoting Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U. S. 302, 324 (2014)). In Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U. S. 477 (2023), for example, we declined to read authorization to “waive or modify” statutory or regulatory provisions applicable to financial assistance programs as a delegation of power to cancel $430 billion in student loan debt. Id., at 494 (quoting 20 U. S. C. §1098bb(a)(1)). In West Virginia v. EPA, we declined to read authorization to determine the “best system of emission reduction” as a delegation of power to force a nationwide transition away from the use of coal. 597 U. S., at 732 (quoting 42 U. S. C. §7411(a)(1)). And in National Federation of Independent Business v. OSHA, 595 U. S. 109 (2022) (per curiam), we declined to read authorization to ensure “safe and healthful working conditions” as a delegation of power to impose a vaccine mandate on 84 million Americans. Id., at 114, 117 (quoting 29 U. S. C. §651(b)); see also, e.g., Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 594 U. S. 758, 764–765 (2021) (per curiam); King v. Burwell, 576 U. S. 473, 485– 486 (2015); Utility Air, 573 U. S., at 324.

We have described several of these cases as “major questions” cases. Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 505; West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 732; see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 159 (2000) (citing S. Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 363, 370 (1986)). In each, the Government claimed broad, expansive power on an uncertain statutory basis. And in each, the statutory text might “[a]s a matter of definitional possibilities” have been read to delegate the asserted power. West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 732 (internal quotation marks omitted). But “context” counseled “skepticism.” Id., at 721, 732. That context included not just other language within the statute, but “constitutional structure” and “common sense.” Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 512, 515 (BARRETT, J., concurring). “[B]oth separation of powers principles and a practical understanding of legislative intent” suggested Congress would not have delegated “highly consequential power” through ambiguous language. West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 723–724.

These considerations apply with particular force where, as here, the purported delegation involves the core congressional power of the purse. “Congress would likely … intend[ ] for itself ” the “basic and consequential tradeoffs,” id., at 730, inherent in uses of this “most complete and effectual weapon,” The Federalist No. 58, at 359. And if Congress were to relinquish that weapon to another branch, a “reasonable interpreter” would expect it to do so “ ‘clearly.’ ” Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 514–515 (BARRETT, J., concurring) (quoting Utility Air, 573 U. S., at 324).

What common sense suggests, congressional practice confirms. When Congress has delegated its tariff powers, it has done so in explicit terms, and subject to strict limits. Congress has consistently used words like “duty” in statutes delegating authority to impose tariffs. (A customs “duty” is simply “the federal tax levied on goods shipped into the United States.” Black’s Law Dictionary 638 (12th ed. 2024).) See, e.g., 19 U. S. C. §1338(d) (“rates of duty”); §2132(a) (“temporary import surcharge … in the form of duties”); §2253(a)(3)(A) (“duty on the imported article”); §2411(c)(1)(B) (“duties or other import restrictions”). It has capped the amount and duration of tariffs. See, e.g., §1338(d) (50% cap); §2132(a) (15% cap, 150-day time limit); §2253(e) (50% cap, phasedown requirement after one year). And it has conditioned exercise of the tariff power on demanding procedural prerequisites. See, e.g., §2252 (investigation by the United States International Trade Commission, public hearings, report of findings and recommendation); §§2411–2414 (investigation by the United States Trade Representative, consultation with relevant country and interested parties, publication of findings).

Against this backdrop of clear and limited delegations, the Government reads IEEPA to give the President power to unilaterally impose unbounded tariffs. On this reading, moreover, the President is unconstrained by the significant procedural limitations in other tariff statutes and free to issue a dizzying array of modifications at will. See supra, at 3. All it takes to unlock that extraordinary power is a Presidential declaration of emergency, which the Government asserts is unreviewable. Brief for Federal Parties 42. And the only way of restraining the exercise of that power is a veto-proof majority in Congress. See 50 U. S. C. §1622(a)(1) (requiring a “joint resolution” “enacted into law” to terminate a national emergency). That view, if credited, would “represent[ ] a ‘transformative expansion’ ” of the President’s authority over tariff policy, West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 724 (quoting Utility Air, 573 U. S., at 324), and indeed—as demonstrated by the exercise of that authority in this case—over the broader economy as well. See Congressional Budget Office, CBO’s Current View of the Economy From 2025 to 2028, p. 5 (Sept. 2025); Brief for Federal Parties 2–3. It would replace the longstanding executive-legislative collaboration over trade policy with unchecked Presidential policymaking. See CRS, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy (2015). Congress seldom effects such sea changes through “vague language.” West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 724.

It is also telling that in IEEPA’s “half century of existence,” no President has invoked the statute to impose any tariffs—let alone tariffs of this magnitude and scope. National Federation of Independent Business, 595 U. S., at 119.3 Presidents have, by contrast, regularly invoked IEEPA for other purposes. CRS, C. Casey, J. Elsea, & L. Rosen, The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use 18–21 (2025). At the same time, they have invoked other statutes—but never IEEPA—to impose tariffs, on products ranging from car tires to washing machines. See, e.g., Presidential Proclamation No. 8414, 3 CFR 115 (2009 Comp.); Presidential Proclamation No. 9694, 83 Fed. Reg. 3553 (2018). And those tariffs did not “even beg[in] to approach the size or scope” of the IEEPA tariffs at issue here. Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 502 (quoting Alabama Assn., 594 U. S., at 765). The “ ‘lack of historical precedent’ ” for the IEEPA tariffs, “coupled with the breadth of authority” that the President now claims, “is a ‘telling indication’ ” that the tariffs extend beyond the President’s “legitimate reach.” National Federation of Independent Business, 595 U. S., at 119 (quoting Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U. S. 477, 505 (2010)).

The “ ‘economic and political significance’ ” of the authority the President has asserted likewise “provide[s] a ‘reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress’ meant to confer such authority.” West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 721 (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U. S., at 159–160). The President’s assertion here of broad “statutory power over the national economy” is “extravagant” by any measure. Utility Air, 573 U. S., at 324. And as the Government admits— indeed, boasts—the economic and political consequences of the IEEPA tariffs are astonishing. The Government points to projections that the tariffs will reduce the national deficit by 4 trillion, and that international agreements reached in reliance on the tariffs could be worth 15 trillion. Brief for Federal Parties 3, 11. In the President’s view, whether “we are a rich nation” or a “poor” one hangs in the balance. Id., at 2. These stakes dwarf those of other major questions cases. See, e.g., Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 483 (430 billion); Alabama Assn., 594 U. S., at 764 (nearly 50 billion); West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 714 (“billions of dollars in compliance costs”). As in those cases, “a reasonable interpreter would [not] expect” Congress to “pawn[ ]” such a “big-time policy call[ ] … off to another branch.” Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 515 (BARRETT, J., concurring).

The Government and the principal dissent attempt to avoid application of the major questions doctrine on several grounds. None is convincing.

The Government argues first that the doctrine should not apply to emergency statutes. Brief for Federal Parties 35– 36. But this argument is nearly identical to one it already advanced in Nebraska. There, the Government contended that a different emergency statute should be interpreted broadly because its “whole point” was to provide “substantial discretion to … respond to unforeseen emergencies.” 600 U. S., at 500 (internal quotation marks omitted). We rejected that argument in Nebraska, and we reject it here as well. “Emergency powers,” after all, “tend to kindle emergencies.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 650 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Dozens of IEEPA emergencies remain ongoing today, including the first—declared over four decades ago in response to the Iranian hostage crisis. CRS, Casey, International Emergency Economic Powers Act, at 20. And as the Framers understood, emergencies can “afford a ready pretext for usurpation” of congressional power. Youngstown, 343 U. S., at 650 (Jackson, J., concurring). Where Congress has reason to be worried about its powers “slipping through its fingers,” id., at 654, we in turn have every reason to expect Congress to use clear language to effectuate unbounded delegations— particularly of its “one great power,” Nicol, 173 U. S., at 515.

The Government’s and the principal dissent’s proposed foreign affairs exception fares no better. Brief for Federal Parties 34–35; post, at 45–57 (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.). As a general matter, the President of course enjoys some “independent constitutional power[s]” over foreign affairs “even without congressional authorization.” FCC v. Consumers’ Research, 606 U. S. 656, 707 (2025) (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring). And Congress certainly may intend to “give the President substantial authority and flexibility” in many foreign affairs or national security contexts. Post, at 48 (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.) (quoting Consumers’ Research, 606 U. S., at 706 (K AVANAUGH, J., concurring)). But “flip[ping]” the “presumption” under the major questions doctrine, Brief for Federal Parties 34, makes little sense when it comes to tariffs. As the Government admits, the President and Congress do not “enjoy concurrent constitutional authority” to impose tariffs during peacetime. Ibid.; Tr. of Oral Arg. 70–71. The Framers gave that power to “Congress alone”—notwithstanding the obvious foreign affairs implications of tariffs. Merritt v. Welsh, 104 U. S. 694, 700 (1882). And whatever may be said of other powers that implicate foreign affairs, we would not expect Congress to relinquish its tariff power through vague language, or without careful limits.

The central thrust of the Government’s and the principal dissent’s proposed exceptions appears to be that ambiguous delegations in statutes addressing “the most major of major questions” should necessarily be construed broadly. Brief for Federal Parties 35. But it simply does not follow from the fact that a statute deals with major problems that it should be read to delegate all major powers for which there may be a “colorable textual basis.” West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 722. It is in precisely such cases that we should be alert to claims that sweeping delegations—particularly delegations of core congressional powers—“lurk[ ]” in “ambiguous statutory text.” Id., at 723 (internal quotation marks omitted). There is no major questions exception to the major questions doctrine.

Accordingly, the President must “point to clear congressional authorization” to justify his extraordinary assertion of the power to impose tariffs. Nebraska, 600 U. S., at 506 (internal quotation marks omitted). He cannot.

B
To begin, IEEPA authorizes the President to “investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit … importation or exportation.” 50 U. S. C. §1702(a)(1)(B). Absent from this lengthy list of powers is any mention of tariffs or duties. That omission is notable in light of the significant but specific powers Congress did go to the trouble of naming. It stands to reason that had Congress intended to convey the distinct and extraordinary power to impose tariffs, it would have done so expressly—as it consistently has in other tariff statutes. See supra, at 8; accord, post, at 11, 26– 27 (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.).

The power to “regulate … importation” does not fill that void. “Regulate,” as that term is ordinarily used, means to “fix, establish, or control; to adjust by rule, method, or established mode; to direct by rule or restriction; to subject to governing principles or laws.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1156 (5th ed. 1979); see also Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 596 U. S. 685, 697 (2022). This definition captures much of what a government does on a day-to-day basis. Indeed, if “regulate” is as broad as the principal dissent suggests, post, at 10–11, then the other eight verbs in §1702(a)(1)(B) are simply wasted ink. But the facial breadth of “regulate” places in stark relief what the term is not usually thought to include: taxation. The U. S. Code is replete with statutes granting the Executive the authority to “regulate” someone or something. Yet the Government cannot identify any statute in which the power to regulate includes the power to tax. The Government concedes, for example, that the Securities and Exchange Commission cannot tax the trading of securities, even though it is expressly authorized to “regulate the trading of … securities.” 15 U. S. C. §78i(h)(1); see Brief for Federal Parties 31–32. We are therefore skeptical that in IEEPA—and IEEPA alone—Congress hid a delegation of its birth-right power to tax within the quotidian power to “regulate.”

Taxes, to be sure, may accomplish regulatory ends. See Sonzinsky, 300 U. S., at 513; Gibbons, 9 Wheat., at 201– 202. But it does not follow that the power to regulate something includes the power to tax it as a means of regulation. Congressional practice suggests as much. When Congress addresses both the power to regulate and the power to tax, it does so separately and expressly. See, e.g., 16 U. S. C. §460bbb–9(a) (distinguishing between the power to “tax persons, franchise, or private property” on lands and the power “to regulate the private lands”); 2 U. S. C. §622(8)(B)(i) (“government-sponsored enterprise” does not have the “power to tax or to regulate interstate commerce”). That is unsurprising, as the “power to regulate commerce” is “entirely distinct from the right to levy taxes.” Gibbons, 9 Wheat., at 201. That Congress did not grant those authorities separately here is strong evidence that “regulate” in IEEPA does not include taxation.

A contrary reading would render IEEPA partly unconstitutional. IEEPA authorizes the President to “regulate … importation or exportation.” 50 U. S. C. §1702(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Taxing exports, however, is expressly forbidden by the Constitution. Art. I, §9, cl. 5.

The “neighboring words” with which “regulate” “is associated” also suggest that Congress did not intend for “regulate” to include the revenue-raising power. United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 294 (2008). “Regulate” is one of nine verbs listed in §1702(a)(1)(B). Each authorizes a distinct action a President might take in sanctioning foreign actors or controlling domestic actors engaged in foreign commerce—blocking imports, for example, or prohibiting transactions. Presidential practice under IEEPA demonstrates as much. See CRS, Casey, International Emergency Economic Powers Act, at 79–106 (Table A–3); see, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13194, 3 CFR 741 (2001 Comp.) (blocking importation of diamonds from insurgent regime in Sierra Leone); Exec. Order No. 12947, 3 CFR 319 (1995 Comp.) (prohibiting transactions with those “who threaten to disrupt the Middle East peace process”). None of IEEPA’s authorities includes the distinct and extraordinary power to raise revenue. And the fact that no President has ever found such power in IEEPA is strong evidence that it does not exist. See supra, at 10; FTC v. Bunte Brothers, Inc., 312 U. S. 349, 351–352 (1941).

We do not attempt to set forth the metes and bounds of the President’s authority to “regulate … importation” under IEEPA. That “interpretive question” is “not at issue” in this case, and any answer would be “plain dicta.” West Virginia, 597 U. S., at 734–735, and n. 5. Our task today is to decide only whether the power to “regulate … importation,” as granted to the President in IEEPA, embraces the power to impose tariffs. It does not.

The Government, echoed point-for-point by the principal dissent, marshals several arguments in response. First, it contends that IEEPA confers the power to impose tariffs because early commentators and this Court’s cases discuss tariffs in the context of the Constitution’s Commerce Clause. See Brief for Federal Parties 24–25; post, at 12–13 (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.). But that answers the wrong question. The question is not, as the Government would have it, whether tariffs can ever be a means of regulating commerce. It is instead whether Congress, when conferring the power to “regulate … importation,” gave the President the power to impose tariffs at his sole discretion. And Congress’s pattern of usage is most relevant to answering that question. That pattern is plain: When Congress grants the power to impose tariffs, it does so clearly and with careful constraints. It did neither here.

The Government raises another contextual argument. Because “regulate” “lies between” two “poles” in IEEPA— “compel” on the affirmative end and “prohibit” on the negative end—the term naturally includes the “less extreme, more flexible” tool of tariffs. Reply Brief 9 (internal quotation marks omitted); see post, at 29–30 (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.) (making a greater-includes-the-lesser argument). But tariffs, as discussed above, are different in kind, not degree, from the other authorities in IEEPA. Unlike those authorities, tariffs operate directly on domestic importers to raise revenue for the Treasury. See 19 U. S. C. §1505(a); 19 CFR §141.1(b) (2025). Even though a tariff is, in some sense, “less extreme” than an outright compulsion or prohibition, it does not follow that tariffs lie on the spectrum between those poles. They are instead “very clear[ly] … a branch of the taxing power,” Gibbons, 9 Wheat., at 201, and fall outside the spectrum entirely.

Finding no support in the statute the President invoked, the Government turns to one he did not: IEEPA’s predecessor, TWEA. Ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411. In 1975, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals held that the authority to “regulate … importation” in TWEA authorized President Nixon to impose limited tariffs. United States v. Yoshida Int’l, Inc., 526 F. 2d 560, 572, 577–578. When Congress enacted IEEPA two years later, the Government contends, it conveyed that same authority (except without the limits). See also post, at 14–17 (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.).

This argument cannot bear the weight the Government places on it. While this Court sometimes assumes that Congress incorporates judicial definitions into legislation, we do so “only when [the] term’s meaning was ‘well-settled’ ” before the adoption. Kemp v. United States, 596 U. S. 528, 539 (2022) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U. S. 1, 22 (1999)); see also United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S. 402, 412–415 (2015). A single, expressly limited opinion from a specialized intermediate appellate court does not clear that hurdle. See BP p.l.c. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 593 U. S. 230, 244 (2021). The tariff authority asserted by President Nixon, moreover, was “far removed” from TWEA’s “original purposes” of sanctioning foreign belligerents. Cohen, Fundamentals of U. S. Foreign Trade Policy, at 178–179. We are therefore skeptical that Congress enacted IEEPA with an eye toward granting that novel power.

The Government has another historical argument based on this Court’s wartime precedents. See generally Brief for Professor Aditya Bamzai as Amicus Curiae; Reply Brief 9– 11, 18. According to the Government, those precedents acknowledge an inherent Presidential power to impose tariffs during armed conflict. And, the argument goes, Congress in TWEA, and then in IEEPA, codified those precedents. But this argument fails at both steps. Insofar as the Government relies on our wartime cases themselves, they are facially inapposite. Regardless of what they might mean for the President’s inherent wartime authority, all agree that the President has no inherent peacetime authority to impose tariffs.

ity to impose tariffs. Nor are we persuaded that the dots connect from our wartime precedents, through multiple iterations of TWEA, to IEEPA, such that IEEPA should be interpreted to grant the President an expansive peacetime tariff power. This argument relies extensively on a series of inferences drawn from scant legislative history. Such an attenuated chain cannot support—much less “clearly” support—a reading of IEEPA that includes the distinct power to impose tariffs. Alabama Assn., 594 U. S., at 764.

Turning to this Court’s precedents, the Government first relies on Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U. S. 548 (1976). There, we held that Section 232(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which allows the President to “adjust the imports” of particular goods to protect national security, includes the power to impose “license fees.” Id., at 561. But that holding bears little on the meaning of IEEPA. As a textual matter, Section 232(b) authorizes the President not only to “adjust … imports,” but (as the Government emphasized in Algonquin) to “take such action … as he deems necessary” to adjust the imports of a good. Brief for Petitioners 26 (emphasis in original) and Tr. of Oral Arg. 6–7, in Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., O. T. 1975, No. 75–382. IEEPA does not contain such sweeping, discretion-conferring language. As for context, Section 232(a) states that “[n]o action shall be taken” to “decrease or eliminate” an existing “duty or other import restriction” if doing so would threaten national security. 19 U. S. C. §1862(a) (1970 ed.). This explicit reference to duties preceding Section 232(b) renders it natural for Section 232(b) itself to authorize duties. Thus, we decline to extend Algonquin’s expressly “limited” holding any further. 426 U. S., at 571.

Finally, the Government invokes Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U. S. 654 (1981), but that case offers no support. Dames & Moore was exceedingly narrow, did not address the President’s power to “regulate,” and did not involve tariffs at all. If anything, that case highlights the importance of close attention to IEEPA’s text. “The terms of … IEEPA,” we held, “do not authorize” the suspension of claims. Id., at 675. So too here; the terms of IEEPA do not authorize tariffs.

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Liberation Day Unilateral Global TariffsApril 2, 2025Abuse of Power

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Trump announces sweeping new tariffs to promote US manufacturing - risking inflation and trade warsnews-reportingAP News
Have Trump’s tariffs worked This is where things stand a year after ‘Liberation Day’news-reportingNPR

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