Supreme Court: Louisiana v. Callais et Al.

Source: SupremeCourt.gov
Type: court-document

Source Text

Excerpt only. The full source text is too long to reproduce here:

Opinion of the Court

JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U. S. C. §10301 et seq., was designed to enforce the Constitution— not collide with it. Unfortunately, lower courts have sometimes applied this Court’s §2 precedents in a way that forces States to engage in the very race-based discrimination that the Constitution forbids.

This tension between §2 and the Constitution came to a head when Louisiana redrew its congressional districts after the 2020 census. In 2022, a federal judge in the Middle District of Louisiana held that the map adopted by the state legislature likely violated §2 because it did not include an additional majority-black district. But when the State drew a new map that contained such a district, its new map was challenged as a racial gerrymander. A three-judge court in the Western District of Louisiana held that the new map violated the Equal Protection Clause, and the State appealed to this Court.

The parties originally briefed and argued this suit last Term, and their arguments at that time highlighted problems in the existing body of §2 case law. One problem resulted from the rule that in racial gerrymandering cases, unlike other cases involving claims of racial discrimination, see, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 265–266 (1977), strict scrutiny is triggered only if race “predominated” in the State’s decisionmaking process. In this suit, Louisiana adopted the challenged map and created the second majority-black district because it quite reasonably anticipated that, if it did not do so, the Middle District of Louisiana would order the use of a map with a differently configured second majorityblack district that would effectively oust an incumbent whom the legislature sought to protect. Under our existing case law, that situation posed the question whether race or politics was the State’s “predominant” motivation.

Another problem stemmed from the long-unresolved question whether compliance with the Voting Rights Act provides a compelling reason that may justify the intentional use of race in drawing legislative districts. For over 30 years, we have assumed for the sake of argument that the answer is yes. See infra, at 9–11. And we have gone further and assumed that it is enough if a State “ ‘ha[s] a strong basis in evidence’ ” for thinking that the Voting Rights Act requires race-based conduct. Cooper v. Harris, 581 U. S. 285, 292–293 (2017). But allowing race to play any part in government decisionmaking represents a departure from the constitutional rule that applies in almost every other context.

These and other problems convinced us that the time had come to resolve whether compliance with the Voting Rights Act can indeed provide a compelling reason for race-based districting. We now answer that question: Compliance with §2, as properly construed, can provide such a reason. Correctly understood, §2 does not impose liability at odds with the Constitution, and it should not have imposed liability on Louisiana for its 2022 map. Compliance with §2 thus could not justify the State’s use of race-based redistricting here. The State’s attempt to satisfy the Middle District’s ruling, although understandable, was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander, and we therefore affirm the decision below.

I
A
Ratified in 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment provides that the “right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” For many years afterward, however, States “heavily suppressed” the right of black citizens to vote. Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee, 594 U. S. 647, 655 (2021). “States employed a variety of notorious methods, including poll taxes, literacy tests, property qualifications, white primaries, and grandfather clauses,” in a “blatant” effort to suppress black voting. Id., at 655–656, and n. 1 (citing H. R. Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 8, 11–13 (1965); S. Rep. No. 162, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, pp. 4–5 (1965); brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Even “as late as the mid-1960s, black registration and voting rates in some States were appallingly low.” Brnovich, 594 U. S., at 656; see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 309– 315 (1966). In addition, States employed legislative districting schemes to prevent the election of black candidates and candidates that black voters preferred. See Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, 602 U. S. 1, 35 (2024); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339, 341 (1960).

Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to enact “appropriate legislation” to enforce the Amendment’s protections, and in 1965 Congress invoked that power to enact the Voting Rights Act. Brnovich, 594 U. S., at 656. “The Act and its amendments in the 1970s specifically forbade some of the practices that had been used to suppress black voting,” including literacy tests and poll taxes. Ibid.; see 52 U. S. C. §10301; §§4(a), (c), 79 Stat. 438–439; §6, 84 Stat. 315; §102, 89 Stat. 400, as amended, 52 U. S. C. §§10303(a), (c), 10501 (prohibiting the denial of the right to vote in any election for failure to pass a test demonstrating literacy, educational achievement or knowledge of any particular subject, or good moral character); see also §10, 79 Stat. 442, as amended, 52 U. S. C. §10306 (declaring poll taxes unlawful); §11, 79 Stat. 443, as amended, 52 U. S. C. §10307 (prohibiting intimidation and the refusal to allow or count votes). We upheld many of these provisions in Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 316, 327–337.

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in its original form “closely tracked the language of the Amendment it was adopted to enforce.” Brnovich, 594 U. S., at 656. At that time, §2 stated simply that “[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.” 79 Stat. 437.

In Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55 (1980), the Court interpreted this language, and four Justices concluded in a plurality opinion that “facially neutral voting practices violate §2 only if motivated by a discriminatory purpose.” Brnovich, 594 U. S., at 658. Justice Stevens, who concurred in the judgment, proposed a different but similarly demanding standard. See Bolden, 446 U. S., at 90–94. Indeed, in his view, a districting practice, even if motivated in part by race, would not violate §2 so long as it was “supported by valid and articulable justifications.” Id., at 91–92.

Bolden roused “ ‘an avalanche of criticism, both in the media and within the civil rights community.’ ” Allen v. Milligan, 599 U. S. 1, 11 (2023) (quoting T. Boyd & S. Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A Legislative History, 40 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1347, 1355 (1983)). Critics argued that a focus on discriminatory intent, rather than discriminatory effects, would defeat worthy claims because of the difficulty of proving intentional discrimination. See 599 U. S., at 11.

Members of Congress evidently shared these concerns. In 1982, shortly after Bolden, Congress sought to abrogate that decision by amending §2. A House bill was “originally passed … under a loose understanding that §2 would prohibit all discriminatory ‘effects’ of voting practices, and that intent would be ‘irrelevant,’ ” but “[t]his version met stiff resistance in the Senate.” Mississippi Republican Executive Comm. v. Brooks, 469 U. S. 1002, 1010 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 97–227, p. 29 (1981)). Critics worried that an effects test would lead to “mandat[ory] racial proportionality in elections,” a scenario “regarded by many as intolerable.” Allen, 599 U. S., at 12. The House and Senate eventually compromised, and the final product included both an effects test in §2(a) and a “robust disclaimer against proportionality” in §2(b). Id., at 13.

This latter provision also specifies what a plaintiff must establish to prove a §2 violation. The provision requires consideration of the “totality of circumstances” in each case and demands proof that the “political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation” by members of a protected class “in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.” 52 U. S. C. §10301(b) (emphasis added). Congress took this language almost verbatim from Justice White’s opinion for the Court in White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973), which involved a “vote dilution” claim, i.e., a claim that a districting scheme impermissibly lessens the weight of the votes of minority voters.

In White, the Court affirmed a judgment that Texas had used two multimember electoral districts “invidiously to cancel out or minimize the voting strength of racial groups.” Id., at 765. According to White, a vote-dilution plaintiff had to show that “the political processes leading to nomination and election were not equally open to participation by the group in question—that its members had less opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice.” Id., at 766.

The decision in White did not say anything one way or another about proof of discriminatory purpose or intent, but the Court’s rationale rested on evidence that gave rise to an obvious inference that the State had set out to prevent the election of candidates preferred by minority voters. The Texas districting scheme generally used single-member districts but employed multimember districts in two parts of the State where single-member districts might have resulted in the election of minority candidates. The Court observed that the use of multimember districts is not “necessarily” or “per se” unconstitutional, but it recognized that such districts can be employed to achieve discriminatory ends. Id., at 765; see also Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 389 (1971) (observing that a switch to at-large elections could be a “metho[d] to maintain white control of the political process”); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 569 (1969) (explaining that a change to at-large voting could nullify the ability of minority voters to elect their candidate of choice). The Court also cited strong evidence that the legislature had done so in the case at hand. Writing at a time when the Democratic Party was dominant in much of Texas, the Court noted that a “white-dominated organization,” which had “effective control” over candidate slating within that party, had engaged in “ ‘racial campaign tactics in white precincts to defeat candidates who had the overwhelming support of the black community,’ ” thereby “ ‘effectively exclud[ing]’ ” the black community “ ‘from participation in the Democratic primary selection process.’ ” White, 412 U. S., at 766–767. The Court likewise cited evidence that the legislature had “invidiously excluded Mexican-Americans from effective participation in political life, specifically in the election of representatives to the Texas House of Representatives.” Id., at 769. Thus, White presented a situation in which circumstantial evidence suggested very strongly that the State had created multimember districts for the purpose of diluting minority votes.

A few years later, when Congress looked for language that would abrogate Mobile v. Bolden’s interpretation of §2, it selected terms that were nearly identical to language used in White. The accompanying Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee explained that the amendment’s purpose was to repudiate Bolden and establish a new votedilution test based on White. See S. Rep. No. 97–417, pp. 2, 15–16, 27 (1982).

B
This Court first construed the amended version of §2 in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30 (1986). Gingles concerned a challenge to North Carolina’s multimember districting scheme on the ground that it diluted the vote of black citizens. Id., at 34–36. Gingles was decided at a time when this Court often paid insufficient attention to the language of statutory provisions, and Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court followed this pattern. Instead of analyzing what the statute said, the opinion simply “quoted the text of amended §2 and then jumped right to the Senate Judiciary Committee Report.” Brnovich, 594 U. S., at 667; see Gingles, 478 U. S., at 42–46. Relying heavily on that Report, the opinion set out three threshold requirements for proving a §2 vote-dilution claim, plus a nonexhaustive list of factors to be considered in making a final decision as to whether the State had violated §2. See id., at 44–45, 48– 51, 80.

To succeed in proving a §2 violation, Gingles taught, a plaintiff must make four showings. First, the plaintiff must show that the minority group in question is “sufficiently large and [geographically] compact to constitute a majority in a reasonably configured district.” Wisconsin Legislature v. Wisconsin Elections Comm’n, 595 U. S. 398, 402 (2022) (per curiam) (citing Gingles, 478 U. S., at 50–51). A district is reasonably configured, we later explained, “if it comports with traditional districting criteria, such as being contiguous and reasonably compact.” Allen, 599 U. S., at 18. “Second, the minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive.” Gingles, 478 U. S., at 51. Third, “the minority must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it … to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.” Ibid. “Finally, a plaintiff who demonstrates the three preconditions must also show, based on the ‘totality of circumstances,’ that the political process is not ‘equally open’ to minority voters.” Allen, 599 U. S., at 18 (quoting Gingles, 478 U. S., at 45–46).

C
In later cases, redistricting plans that States created to comply with the Voting Rights Act were themselves challenged as racial gerrymanders. This Court approached such cases by building on the framework from other racialdiscrimination cases under the Equal Protection Clause. In those cases, if race played a role in a decision made by a government actor, strict scrutiny applied. See Arlington Heights, 429 U. S., at 265–266. Under this standard, the government needed to assert a compelling interest that justified its use of race; and if the analysis progressed beyond this point, the government had to show that its use of race was narrowly tailored to vindicate that interest. See, e.g., Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 600 U. S. 181, 206 (2023) (SFFA).

The Court modified this framework for racial gerrymandering cases. Although any use of race in government decisionmaking generally triggers strict scrutiny, in gerrymandering cases a challenger must show that race was the government’s predominant consideration. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U. S. 952, 964 (1996) (plurality opinion). And in cases where race predominated, States would sometimes assert that compliance with the Voting Rights Act provided a compelling interest justifying the use of race. Yet we never decided whether compliance with the Act could constitute a compelling interest. Instead, we repeatedly assumed without deciding that the Voting Rights Act could constitute a compelling interest because in all those cases, the Act actually did not demand the State’s race-predominant districting. Thus, the States in those cases could not satisfy strict scrutiny regardless of whether compliance with the Voting Rights Act could provide a compelling interest.

The first case in which the Court explicitly made this assumption was Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 917–920 (1995), which concerned a majority-black district that was designed to satisfy the Justice Department’s preclearance demands under §5 of the Voting Rights Act. The Miller Court first found that the legislature had “subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles, including but not limited to compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared interests, to racial considerations.” Id., at 916. For this reason, the Court held, race had predominated in the creation of the new district, and the State had to “demonstrate that its districting legislation [wa]s narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest.” Id., at 920. The Court declined to address “[w]hether or not in some cases compliance with the [Voting Rights Act], standing alone, c[ould] provide a compelling interest independent of any interest in remedying past discrimination.” Id., at 921. Instead, the Court explained that the “challenged district was not reasonably necessary under a constitutional reading and application” of the Voting Rights Act, so the State’s goal of complying with the Act could not supply a compelling interest. Ibid.

We repeated much the same analysis in Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U. S. 899, 908 (1996) (Shaw II ), applying strict scrutiny to a redistricting plan that a State crafted to comply with both §2 and §5 of the Voting Rights Act. “[O]nce again,” we did not reach the question “expressly left open” in Miller: whether the Voting Rights Act could itself provide a compelling interest to justify race-predominant districting. 517 U. S., at 911. After “assum[ing], arguendo, for the purpose of resolving this suit, that compliance with §2 could be a compelling interest,” we held that the plan failed strict scrutiny because it was not reasonably required under a constitutional reading and application of the Voting Rights Act. Id., at 915.

Likewise, in Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U. S. 254, 259 (2015), we applied strict scrutiny to a race-predominant districting plan that the State had created for two purposes: first, to “come close to a one-person, one-vote ideal,” and second, to “ensure compliance” with §5 of the Voting Rights Act. We held that, even if the Voting Rights Act could provide a compelling interest, the map did not satisfy strict scrutiny because it was not required by the Act. Id., at 277. Once again, we left open whether compliance with the Act “remain[ed] a compelling interest.” Id., at 279.

In Cooper, 581 U. S., at 301, we continued our “long”standing assumption that “complying with the VRA is a compelling interest.” Again, we did not need to resolve this question because a constitutional reading and application of the Act did not require the district at issue. Id., at 306. And again, in Wisconsin Legislature, we once more “assumed that complying with the [Voting Rights Act] is a compelling interest.” 595 U. S., at 401. But because the Wisconsin Supreme Court had not properly analyzed whether the Act required the map at issue, we remanded for the court to “undertake a full strict-scrutiny analysis.” Id., at 406. This was the legal framework in place when the lawsuits involving Louisiana’s congressional districts were filed and litigated in the lower courts.

II
As noted earlier, the underlying litigation in this suit resulted from Louisiana’s response to the population changes disclosed by the 2020 census. The subsequent reapportionment of House seats among the States left Louisiana with the same number of seats—six—that it had previously been allocated, but due to shifts in population, the State needed to recalibrate its districts.

In 2022, Louisiana enacted a new map, “HB1,” that closely resembled its immediate predecessor:

HB1, like its predecessor, included only one district in which black voters were a majority of the voting-age population. (In the above maps, it is the bat-shaped District 2 that includes much of New Orleans, blue in Figure 1 and yellow in Figure 2.) As soon as HB1 was enacted, lawsuits were filed in the Middle District of Louisiana asserting that the map violated the Voting Rights Act by “ ‘packing’ large numbers of Black voters into a single majority-Black congressional district … and ‘cracking’ the remaining Black voters among the other five districts.” Robinson v. Ardoin, 605 F. Supp. 3d 759, 768 (2022). After the suit was filed, the Robinson court issued a lengthy opinion concluding that HB1 likely violated the Voting Rights Act by failing to include a second majority-black district. The court thus entered a preliminary injunction requiring Louisiana to implement a new map before the 2022 election, which was less than six months away. Id., at 856.

Louisiana objected to the decision and promptly appealed. But because of circumstances outside the State’s control, its appeal ended up in limbo. This Court granted certiorari before judgment and held the case pending a decision in Allen. Nearly a year later, after deciding Allen, the Court dismissed the petition as improvidently granted and remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit to consider Louisiana’s appeal in the ordinary course. By that time, the 2022 election had passed, and the urgency that had justified the preliminary injunction was no longer present. In a tentatively worded opinion, the Fifth Circuit held that the Robinson District Court’s decision “was valid when it was issued” but that the preliminary injunction was no longer needed. Robinson v. Ardoin, 86 F. 4th 574, 599–600 (2023).

In the absence of urgency, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the District Court with instructions to give Louisiana time to draw a new map. If Louisiana failed to do so, the Fifth Circuit suggested, the District Court could proceed with a trial on the merits and, if needed, remedial proceedings. Id., at 601–602.

After the Fifth Circuit’s remand, Louisiana did not have many options. In the Robinson decision, the District Court held that the plaintiffs were “likely to prevail” on their claim that the Voting Rights Act demanded the creation of a second majority-black district. 605 F. Supp. 3d, at 851. So if Louisiana refused to adopt such a map, the District Court would likely draw one and mandate its use. Wishing to avoid that outcome, Louisiana decided to draw its own map. After a deliberative process, Louisiana enacted the map at issue in this suit: SB8.

SB8 retains the original majority-minority district from HB1 (above in yellow). It then adds an additional majorityminority district, District 6 (above in green). To attain a majority-black voting-age population, District 6 connects black populations from Baton Rouge and Lafayette (in the southcentral region of the State) with the black population in Shreveport (in the far northwest of the State). SB8 differed from the illustrative maps—shown below—on which the District Court relied in Robinson:

These illustrative maps also include a second majorityminority district, but one with very different boundaries (shown in blue in the top four maps and in green in the bottom two maps). This district connects largely urban black communities in Baton Rouge and Lafayette with more rural black communities in the northeast corner of the State. By contrast, SB8’s District 6 connects the Baton Rouge and Lafayette black populations with the distant black population in Shreveport, in the northwest. Louisiana adopted this scheme, rather than the one used in the Robinson illustrative maps, because it protects the Republican incumbents the State considered most important: Speaker of the House Mike Johnson, House Majority Leader Steve Scalise, and Appropriations Committee member Julia Letlow. See Brief for Appellant in No. 24–109, pp. 13–14, 17.

Not long after SB8 was enacted, another lawsuit was filed, this time in the Western District of Louisiana. A group of plaintiffs (the Callais plaintiffs) asserted that SB8, and specifically District 6, was a racial gerrymander that violated the Equal Protection Clause. The plaintiffs from Robinson intervened in the litigation, seeking to defend Louisiana’s decision to draw a second majority-minority district. Because the Callais plaintiffs challenged “the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts,” a District Court of three judges was convened to hear the suit. 28 U. S. C. §2284(a). The court held a 3-day preliminary injunction hearing, which was consolidated with a trial on the merits.

Observing that SB8’s “second majority-minority district … stretches some 250 miles from Shreveport in the northwest corner of the state to Baton Rouge in southeast Louisiana, slicing through metropolitan areas to scoop up pockets of predominantly Black populations from Shreveport, Alexandria, Lafayette, and Baton Rouge,” the court concluded that the map effected a racial gerrymander that “violates the Equal Protection Clause.” Callais v. Landry, 732 F. Supp. 3d 574, 582, 588 (WD La. 2024). Judge Stewart of the Fifth Circuit dissented. See id., at 614. The State of Louisiana and the Robinson intervenors appealed the decision directly to this Court, and the Court noted probable jurisdiction. 604 U. S. 1007 (2024). See 28 U. S. C. §1253.

After an initial round of briefing and argument last Term, the Court restored these cases to the calendar for reargument this Term. See 606 U. S. 923 (2025). We ordered supplemental briefing on the following question: “Whether the State’s intentional creation of a second majority-minority congressional district violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments to the U. S. Constitution.” 606 U. S. 993 (2025). And because the State’s intentional creation of a second majority-minority district had been prompted by an order suggesting that such a district is required by the Voting Rights Act, our question necessarily implicated the correctness of our longstanding assumption that compliance with the Voting Rights Act may justify what the Constitution generally condemns: the use of race as a basis for government action. This question was pending in several lower-court cases, but in light of the potential impact of those cases on upcoming elections, we concluded that resolution of the question in this suit was appropriate.

III
A
In considering whether the Constitution permits the intentional use of race to comply with the Voting Rights Act, we start with the general rule that the Constitution almost never permits the Federal Government or a State to discriminate on the basis of race. Such discrimination triggers strict scrutiny, and our precedents have identified “only two compelling interests” that can satisfy that standard. SFFA, 600 U. S., at 207. One compelling interest, not relevant here, is “avoiding imminent and serious risks to human safety in prisons, such as a race riot.” Ibid.; see Johnson v. California, 543 U. S. 499, 512–513 (2005). The only other compelling interest we have found is “remediating specific, identified instances of past discrimination that violated the Constitution or a statute.” SFFA, 600 U. S., at 207.

To “rise to the level of a compelling state interest,” an effort to remediate past discrimination “must satisfy two conditions.” Shaw II, 517 U. S., at 909. “First, the discrimination must be ‘identified discrimination.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 499, 500, 505, 507, 509 (1989)). In other words, the State or Federal Government must identify the specific instances of past discrimination that it aims to remediate and, in light of that specification, must “ ‘determine the precise scope of the injury it seeks to remedy.’ ” 517 U. S., at 909 (quoting Croson, 488 U. S., at 498 (opinion for the Court)). The States and Federal Government have no compelling interest in generally remediating “past discrimination in a particular industry or region” or “the effects of societal discrimination.” 517 U. S., at 909–910. Second, after identifying the specific instance of discrimination, “the institution that makes the racial distinction must have … a ‘strong basis in evidence’ to conclude that [its] remedial action [is] necessary.” Id., at 910 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267, 277 (1986)).

“Our acceptance of race-based state action has been rare for a reason.” SFFA, 600 U. S., at 208. “ ‘Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U. S. 495, 517 (2000)). And in redistricting, “where the State assumes from a group of voters’ race that they ‘think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls,’ it engages in racial stereotyping at odds with equal protection mandates.” Miller, 515 U. S., at 920 (quoting Shaw I, 509 U. S. 630, 647 (1993)).

The question before us now is whether compliance with the Voting Rights Act should be added to our very short list of compelling interests that can justify racial discrimination. To answer that question, we must understand exactly what §2 of the Voting Rights Act demands with respect to the drawing of legislative districts. We therefore turn to the text of that provision.

Events Citing This Source

Event	Date	Category
Louisiana v Callais Voting Rights Act	Apr 29, 2026	Erosion of Democratic Norms

People Mentioned

Person	Role

Institutions Mentioned

Institution	Description

Related Sources

Source	Type	Publisher
NAACP Legal Defense Fund - Louisiana v. Callais	news-reporting	NAACP
Congressional Redistricting - High Court Narrows Voting Rights Act in Louisiana v. Callais	congressional-record	Congress.gov